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Abstract One of the main issue with data sharing in cloud environment is to
manage user access and its auto revocation in a controlled and flexible way. The
issue becomes more complex when privacy on user access has to be ensured as
well to hide additional leakage of information. For automatic revocation over cloud
data, access can be bounded within certain anticipated time limit so that the access
expires beyond effective time period. This time-oriented approach is more rigid and
not a one-size-fits-all solution. In certain circumstances exact time anticipation is
not an easy choice. Instead, the alternate solution could be task-oriented to restrict
user beyond certain number of permissible attempts to access the data. We have
proposed Oblivious User Management (OUM) in which a user can have access on
cloud data for certain number of attempts without imposing any time restriction.
For user authorization and her subsequent revocation, owner will perform one
time setup activity and that is same for all users. The model also alleviates the
burden of managing different access parameters at user end with each request as
she will always use the same parameter for all valid attempts. Our approach also
conceals the privacy of user attempts throughout the communication. Hiding this
information helps to avoid distinguishing importance of particular user that has
more authorization over others. Evaluation results have proved that OUM hides
(N−1) number of permissible attempts until N th request arrives at Cloud Storage.
Performance analysis revealed that the cost of operations performed in OUM are
within the range of .097 to .278 $ per 1000 requests.
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1 Introduction
Cloud computing has a profound impact towards society over the past few years.
As a significant technology trend, its evolutionary role has reshaped IT services
manifold [1, 2]. Features like scalability, elasticity and fault tolerance have made
cloud computing most suitable for a robust business environment. Usage of cloud
computing is quite economical due to its pay-per-use model where a subscriber
does not need to manage the computing resources [3, 4]. These features have
made it possible for cloud proponents to afford computers and storage resources
that, just a few years ago, would have been available only to enterprises [5, 6].
The need for massive storage space and its intelligent utilization are two main
reasons in building towards the epitome of cloud computing which otherwise not
possible on commodity hardware [7, 8]. It is believed that the amount of data
is doubling after every eighteen (18) months and world creates five exabytes of
information every two days [9, 10]. This trend will make data growth 44 times
between 2009 and 2020 [11]. Besides social media, data generated from machines
and sensors massively contribute for this data explosion [12]. The cloud storage
accommodates this intensity, volume and variety of data easily which would have
been thrown away only a few years ago. One objective for housing this trove of data
is the extraction and utilization of functional intelligence and hidden knowledge
from it. Specialized and highly skilled professionals transforms tons of data into
crux of useful information. Although, the required skill set for this transformation
is not widely available, still there exist few organizations which have specialization
for this job and offer services to their clients globally [12, 13]. Companies that once
use to rely on their in house data streams have now started utilizing this func-
tional knowledge as a catalyst for effective business proliferation. Realization of
this fact has changed the business landscape where organizations are now totally
data driven [14].
Authorization on cloud data has various access models depending upon its
type [2] and priorities set by its owner and user. A public data [15, 16] has an
open access where as sensitive data e.g, related to health, individual or organi-
zation is protected with encryption [17, 18] and is accessible by authorized users
only. Temporal data bears its value for certain interval of time and a customized
data is prepared for a selected range of audience [12, 13, 19]. If outsourced data
is sensitive or valuable, owner concern would be to protect it from unauthorized
access by applying techniques of encryption or anonymization [17, 18, 20]. While
utilizing cloud services it is desired that leakage on data contents must be avoided
or kept minimal at least. For this purpose encrypted outsourcing is strongly en-
couraged [21, 22]. Encryption hides details on data for a curious CSP, which is the
first external entity that can have complete or partial insight about the contents
uploaded on it.
From user perspective who will use this data has altogether different require-
ments. She might be interested to hide her identity or does not want to show off
her authorization limit in advance for a particular resource. Protection on this
aspect helps to secure business privacy to be revealed until it is totally consumed.
For example, Alice, Bob and Malory are solving a criminal case. Alice is the lead
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detective and has higher authority and access permission on this case. To avoid
any external influence on Alice, this information has to be concealed until the
case is solved completely. In this task oriented scenario and others similar to this,
besides protecting the original data, achieving privacy on user access is equally
important.
Leakage of unnecessary information is not limited with outsourced data alone,
user access models and patterns on access log is another avenue for a curious CSP
to know about additional information. Considering another example where a re-
source being accessed frequently by a large pool of users reveals its importance.
A single resource, which is accessed sequentially by multiple users from within
an organization can sketch out the work flow of that organization. A particular
resource, which is accessed on cloud usually ends up in a valid reply or with re-
sponse of “Not Found” which tells about its presence or absence. While preventing
the unsolicited disclosure of sensitive information additional measures like obliv-
ious access policies [23, 24, 25] and oblivious term matching [47] help to avoid
indirect leakage of information. It includes Ciphertext-Policy attribute-based en-
cryption (CP-ABE)[26], Key-policy ABE [27], which are the branches of Attribute
Based Encryption (ABE)[28]. Besides all these access patterns there is another pa-
rameter, which is a potential resource for leaking the unnecessary and unwanted
information and that is related with user management.
The user that has been granted with permission to access cloud data usually
require to be revoked for subsequent requests at a later stage. This revocation
can be done by the owner who gave her the authorization at first step; however,
this activity becomes hectic when number of users and frequency of authorization
and revocation is very high. Therefore, the owner of information has choice to
delegate authority of user revocation to CSP or semi trusted third party (TTP).
A similar realization on user revocation has been addressed in [29] where user
access is bound for certain time period. The methodology presented in [29] also
meets the user’s concerns where she does not want to disclose her access period
in advance. In this time-oriented system a user access remains active on cloud
data for predetermined time. This technique might work well where anticipation
of time is trivial. For situations where time anticipation is hard to determine in
advance, this technique would not be that much effective. We will augment this
with a simple example where a user Alice has been granted permission for certain
period of time, say, until March 2014 for a particular data resource on a cloud. Al-
ice would like to use this data with additional information which she is expecting
from another resource and that is delivered to her in April 2014. In this situation
Alice access rights on cloud data have already been expired for which she needs to
be given with fresh account or extension in the existing one. Reliance on external
factor which is time independent can make entire situation task oriented rather
time oriented. The permission that has been granted to Alice has to be availed
before her time expires, no matter it is useful for her or not, which is too strict.
The solution for this scenario could be to allow herself for certain number of per-
missible attempts which should be independent from time and that too without
disclosing them in advance. She can access the data when it is most suitable for
her and her authorization will become ineffective after the permissible attempts
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have been availed.
Through OUM, following contributions have been made in the area of oblivious
access policies while interacting with cloud data:
– for user revocation, owner does not have to be online 24/7,
– task oriented provisioning of cloud data makes it convenient for users to access
data in their own time,
– users concern for hiding their permissible attempts from their peers as a busi-
ness secret is possible with OUM,
– oblivious evaluation of user request does not help cloud service provider (CSP)
to infer total number of permissible attempts at any stage before all have been
availed. For this purpose, services of trusted third party have been utilized.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 is on related work. Tech-
nical preliminaries used in this paper are presented in Section 3. System Model,
design goal and assumptions are given in Section 4. Construction of OUM in-
cluding main idea is in Section 5. Detail on implementation is given in Section
6. Section 7 is on result evaluation. Salient features, discussion on user request
patterns and system limitations are given in Section 8. Finally, we conclude our
paper and provide future direction in Section 9.
2 Related Work
We assume that user management starts with her authorization and ends with
revocation over cloud data. To incapacitate any single out of N users on encrypted
data, there exist few approaches. The first one, which is a naive solution is to
re-encrypt the complete data and re-distribute the new decryption keys to (N −1)
users. This approach is quite computationally intensive when frequency of users
entering and leaving the system is very high. In addition, data owner has to be
online all the time to execute this operation, which is difficult to maintain 24/7. Re-
laxing responsibilities for data owner can be achieved using Proxy Re-Encryption
(PRE) [18, 30] either through TTP CSP. PRE converts a cipher text that can be
decrypted by Alice into another cipher text that can be decrypted by Bob. This
whole operation hides the actual data being transformed from one key to another.
Work done by [31] is considered a pioneer to combine Key-Policy ABE (KP-ABE)
and PRE to delegate most of the computation tasks involved in user revocation
to the CSP. Still, activating PRE by CSP awaits for an event to trigger, which
is again responsibility of data owner. To handle this issue, activation of PRE has
been coupled with time in such a way that user authorization expires on predeter-
mined time [32]. This approach also conceals user effective time period from CSP
to know in advance. Allowing CSP to know about user effective time period on
cloud data can reveal user importance who has permission for longer time than
other users.
The outsourced data in a public cloud has its own importance and value. Em-
ploying encryption on this trove of information is mostly a favorable choice by
the data owner. On the other hand, hiding access patterns is more desirable and
appreciated by users who will use this data. In recent research, which is cited in
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upcoming discussion is related to conceal user access and possible leakage of in-
formation on her behalf. Instead of giving exact IDs to authorized users, certain
descriptive attributes are more suitable for identification. If Alice who is a man-
ager in a company, instead of using Alice as her ID, the attribute of ‘manager’
is preferred. The same idea has been chosen in (CP-ABE) [33],[34] by employing
the Ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption (CP-ABE) Using this technique,
identities of users can be concealed by using feature of attributes instead of exact
IDs.
User revocation is a complex process and very few techniques have been used to
handle this issue in cloud model. In [32] the idea of time based proxy re-encryption
has been employed. In this work, usage of CP-ABE is extended with HABE [35, 36]
by using the concept of time to trigger automatic proxy-re encryption. In this ap-
proach the granularity of time has been sliced into three layers, namely: year,
month and day. This solution is prepared for situation where time anticipation
can be determined in advance before a user is granted access over cloud data. Re-
voking user access rights using this methodology is appealing for situations where
time anticipation is a trivial. In task oriented situations this solution will be least
effective.
Besides revoking a user from subsequent request on cloud data, it is also very
important to determine the mechanism with which CSP will evaluate and come
to know that further access has to be ceased. The simple solution is to let CSP
know about effective time of all users in advance. If longer access duration implies
user importance then it is open to CSP with this naive solution. The work in
[37], which require users to expose their tickets to CSP, may also expose effective
time of each ticket. This approach might also be interesting to know for a curious
CSP when two competitors are assigned on a same resource where authorization
of one user is higher than the other. For users who consider this information as
their business secret would avoid to go with this solution or any other similar
to it. In this paper we have considered two issues, which are subset of above
discussion. First, automatic user revocation and that too independent from time.
Second, hiding user authorization attempts throughout her communication with
cloud. For CSP, these attempts would remain unknown to predict and hard to
distinguish between any number of users. In OUM’s design we have utilized the
cryptographic primitives of homomorphic encryption[38] and private matching [39]
to meet the desired results.
3 Technical Preliminaries
Before we elaborate the design and working methodology of OUM, we introduce
few preliminaries used in its development
3.1 Homomorphic Encryption
A cryptographic mechanism is said to be homomorphic if its encryption function
EH holds the property i.e., EH(x)∗EH(y) = EH(x+y). A homomorphic encryption
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is said to be semantically secure if EH reveals no information about x and y, and
making it computationally infeasible to ascertain and distinguish the case where
x 6= y and x = y [40].
Pascal Paillier [41] proposed a public key encryption scheme which is additively
homomorphic, and consists of subsequent fundamental algorithms.
3.1.1 Key Generation
Let p and q be two large primes and n = p.q. Euler’s totient function is denoted by
φ(n) and λ(n) represents Carmicheal’s function. For n, the product of two primes,
φ(n) = (p − 1)(q − 1) and λ(n) = lcm(p − 1, q − 1). These two functions holds
following properties over the multiplicative group Z∗n2 , i.e.,
|Z∗n2 | = φ(n2) = n.φ(n) (1)
and for any ω ∈ Z∗n2
ωφ(n) = 1 (mod n) (2)
ωnφ(n) = 1 (mod n2) (3)
Public key PK is defined as (n, g), where g is an element of Z∗n2 , and secret key
SK as λ(n).
3.1.2 Encryption
To encrypt any message ‘m’ where m ∈ Zn, randomly choose y ∈R Z∗n2 , and define
an encryption function EH , such that
EH : Zn × Z∗n 7→ Z∗n2 (4)
EH(m, y) = gmyn(mod n2) (5)
3.1.3 Decryption
To decrypt the ciphertext c, L is defined as (u − 1)/n, ∀u ∈ {u|u = 1(mod n)}.
Ciphertext c can be decrypted by using secret key SK = λ(n), Dg as
DH(c, λ(n)) = L(c
λ(n) (mod n2))
L(gλ(n) (mod n2))
(6)
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3.1.4 Homomorphic Operation
Arithmetic addition between the ciphertexts, c1 = EH(m1, y1) and c2 = EH(m2, y2),
is obliviously computed as:
EH(m1, y1) = gm1y1n(mod n2)
EH(m2, y2) = gm2y2n(mod n2)
EH(m1, y1).Eg(m2, y2) = gm1+m2(y1.y2)n(mod n2)
= EH(m1 +m2) (7)
3.2 Private Matching
Private matching (PM) [42] is a value matching protocol. It assists two interactive
parties or entities to find set intersection over their private set of values, without
revealing any element of their private set to each other. It uses homomorphic
encryption to identify the commonalities amongst the private sets, whilst ensuring
privacy of each set.
Suppose, there is a client C and a server S. C has its own private set of values
X : {x1, x2 . . . xn}, and S has values Y : {y1, y2 . . . yn}. C wants to compute set
intersection with S over the private set of values (i.e., X ,Y). However, C does not
want to seep out any information about X , with an exception of set cardinality.
To identify the commonalities between X and Y, C computes a polynomial (see
equation 8), whose roots are members of X .
P (x ∈ X ) = (x− x1)(x− x2) . . . (x− xn)
=
n∑
i=0
αix
i (8)
C then sends the homomorphicly encrypted coefficients (αˆ0...n) of P (x) to S. By
using αˆ, S evaluates P (y) for every element of its private set. It then computes
oblivious value by multiplying evaluated P (y) with a random number r and adding
it to y, i.e., EH(r.P (y) + y), where EH is a homomorphic encryption algorithm.
These oblivious values are then send to C for decryption. At C, the decryption of
an oblivious value results in y, if P (y) computed by S is evaluated at z, such that
〈z ⊆ ⋂ | (z ∈ X ) ∧ (z ∈ Y)〉. Otherwise, C ends up generating a random value. At
the end of this protocol, C learns only the intersection set; whereas, S ascertains
nothing more than the cardinality of X . Complexity and degree of polynomial in
equation 8 is dependent on x1...n. Although we have used the same idea in OUM
but instead of creating polynomial with higher degree, we used only Ua and ψ,
where ψ is offset value of user such that,
P (x ∈ X ) = (x− ψ)(x− (ψ + Ua) (9)
Here, ψ is unique for each user.
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4 Models, design goals, and assumptions
4.1 System Model
CSP, TTP, data user and data owner are considered to be the involved entities to
realize oblivious evaluation of user request in cloud storage. For brevity we have
also referred them as cloud storage, third party, user and owner respectively. Due
to large volume and variety of data, it is shared with users through synchronization
service. Upon receiving request, cloud storage sync the updated version of data
with authorized user.The owner owns the rightfully processed data useful for its
users on pay per access model. The pricing model on data synchronization depends
upon its volume and number of user attempts. Only authorized users willing to
pay for this information have access to the data synchronization facility on cloud
storage. Third party acts as a mediator and transforms the user request obliviously
for cloud storage. Cloud server obliviously evaluates forwarded request and only
learns that the request falls within the subscription or not. In case the request falls
within the subscription limit cloud storage synchronize data with user or denies
otherwise.
4.2 Security Model
The protection mechanism like encryption is a non trivial barrier for a malicious
or curious user to know about unauthorized data. The indirect knowledge that
slips away through legitimate communication is another source for acquiring al-
lied information. In OUM, allied information means ‘user permissible attempts’
and legitimate communication means ‘communication made by authorized users’.
Our model of OUM safeguards privacy of user access by hiding the permissible
attempts. Neither the third party or curious cloud storage can learn about exact
attempts in advance or during evaluation process of user request. Partially and
obliviously execution of user request at both, third party and cloud storage helps
to achieve this model. This model further incapacitate cloud storage to calculate
the entire life cycle for user access in advance. The indication for cloud storage
to stop further requests is popped only when a user forwards her request beyond
authorized quota. This is the only situation where CSP will learn about it.
4.3 System Design Goal
Controlling and restricting user access on cloud storage has been met with vari-
ous access policies and security models depending upon requirements of user and
owner. These access policies facilitate owner and user according to their needs
while exploiting cloud resources at maximum. OUM is also claimed as a similar
system but with distinctive design features. In OUM, bar of managing user revo-
cation is handled by third party and CSP whereas privacy of user authorization
is also preserved during the legitimate communication. Further, user is free to
avail her access rights independent from time restriction. The automatic termina-
tion of user access under constant set of operations boost up system’s efficiency.
The pivotal design goal of our system is three-fold. First, any particular user has
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same access mechanism and execution time irrespective how many attempts she
is authorized with. Second, the owner does not need to revoke authorized user
herself, the system mechanism itself inform on it. Third, the cloud storage and
semi trusted third party will learn nothing about the valid attempts until all have
been availed.
4.4 Assumption and Notations
OUM focuses on enabling task oriented and privacy-aware data access from cloud
storage. We intentionally neglected the details of data sharing from security and
privacy point of view. Readers may refer to [43] for more details on efficient and
secure data sharing in cloud storage. Third party is assumed to process the partial
computation with honest operation and rightfully issuing the offset value for each
user request. Table 1 illustrates the notations that we use to explain the core
concept of OUM.
Dp represents the periodically updated data outsourced to cloud storage, ac-
cessible by authorized subscribers only. Uid represents the ID for authorized user
over Dp. Ua is number of user attempts for which user is authorized to access
Dp. EH and DH are homomorphic encryption and decryption functions respec-
tively. For realizing secure communication between TTP and CSP, EA and DA
are asymmetric encryption functions, which ensure, that only CSP can decrypt
the information sent by TTP. α0...n are polynomial coefficients that are evaluated
partially by third party. ∆y1...n,n+1 represent oblivious values that are calculated
by CSP as a result of private matching protocol. ψ represent the offset value for a
particular user. Ω is a constant operation performed with α0...n,n+1 by TTP. unionmulti is
a constant operation performed by cloud storage that ends up in Ev or Rv which
is echo or residual value respectively.
5 Proposed System
Following discussion is about the main idea, data outsourcing, user registration
and initial setup and evaluation of user request at TTP and CSP.
We have used OUM in a system which is task oriented. In this system multiple
users are interested to access cloud data to enhance their respective business mod-
els. This data resource is shared through synchronization with valid users having
valid requests. As a business secret, the number of permissible attempts for each
user are kept unknown throughout the communication and for flexibility the access
model does not impose any time restriction. With each request initiated by the
user, it travels through third party and reaches at CSP. Upon receiving user re-
quest, CSP performs a constant operation on it and ends up in a finite value. This
value indicates either the user request falls within the subscription limit or not.
In very first request made by a particular user, this value is noted by CSP against
her ID. During user interaction, this value repeats itself only once if request falls
beyond the subscription limit. Repetition of this value is adjusted during the setup
process by owner and it cannot be predicted until user has availed all attempts. On
this repeating value further access is ceased by CSP. We call this as echo value Ev
and all others in between them as Residual values Rv. This mechanism is designed
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Table 1: Notations used in the descriptive detail of OUM.
Notation Description
Dp Periodically updated data that is outsourced for shar-
ing on a cloud.
Ua User attempts for which authorization is granted.
∂ User access parameter for unique identification
EH , DH Homomorphic encryption and decryption algorithms.
σpk, σsk Public and secret keys for homomorphic encryption
algorithm.
EA, DA Asymmetric encryption and decryption algorithms.
kpub, kpri Public and private key pair for asymmetric encryption
algorithm.
α0...n List of coefficients of a polynomial P that defined for
TTP.
∆y1...n,n+1 Oblivious values: result range of homomorphic evalu-
ation at CSP for a particular user with n number of
valid requests. Oblivious value for (n+ 1)th request is
denoted with ∆yn+1 .
ψ Offset value for user .
Ω Constant operation performed by TTP with user re-
quest over α0...n.
Υ1...n Partialy computed result at TTP.
unionmulti Constant operation performed by CSP on Υ1...n which
ends up in ∆y1...n,n+1
Ev Echo value, which repeats itself only twice during the
entire lifetime of user access period such that.Ev =
∆y1 and Ev = ∆yn+1
Rv The evaluation results at CSP with each user request
other than Ev , are considered as residual values such
that Rv =
∑n
i=2∆yi.
Œ Digital certificate of TTP
in such a way that CSP cannot predict any pattern from this key or residual values
even for two users having same number of permissible attempts. To accomplish
this model we have also utilized services of a semi trusted third party (TTP).
We first briefly present the main idea for this oblivious data synchronization
then we describe the details of our methodology and setup activity.
5.1 Main Idea
DataKon is a large research enterprise that deals with data related to weather,
health, crime and social media. Statistical analysis on its data-hive provides inter-
esting and useful patterns for hospitals, law enforcement agencies and few busi-
ness organizations which are permanent stakeholders with DataKon. Voluminous
growth of data under analysis and realization of Big-data [44] has made DataKon
to utilize cloud services offered by Eve for both storage and computation. An expert
team of analysts and computer programmers fully exploit the offered resources for
deep insight to reveal the hidden knowledge and functional intelligence. The ability
to analyze and forecast crime, health issues, drug consumption and social inter-
action has improved well due to DataKon services. Recently few small/medium
organizations have realized that utilizing this data can assist their business model
more efficiently to enhance their product line. FutureLife is one famous insurance
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Fig. 1: Abstract model for oblivious user management (OUM) in a cloud storage
company in the town, which is interested to access this service to assist its business
policies. FutureLife also wants that value of its subscription limit should not be
revealed to anyone until all attempts have been availed. Desire of this preference
by FutureLife is to hide this fact from peer organizations that how frequent it may
revise its business plan.
FutureLife wants to consult DataKon service for n times and got the authoriza-
tion for that. During the setup phase of OUM , DataKon shares certain parameters
with TTP and CSP for its new customer i.e, FutureLife. OUM ensures that nei-
ther the TTP nor the CSP can deduce the valid attempts in advance. The request
made by FutureLife routes through the TTP and reaches at CSP. Evaluation re-
sults by CSP distinguishes between valid and invalid requests. For valid request,
updated information is shared with FutureLife and this activity is logged at CSP
for the billing purpose. DataKon will pay the CSP for this synchronization service
on behalf of FutureLife only for valid logs (valid attempts only). After availing the
permissible attempts if FutureLife forwards its request for (n+ 1)th attempt (be-
yond authorization) the evaluation result will end up in Ev, which is indication for
CSP to cease user access from that point onward. Explanation on this indication
through Ev is given in Section 5.1.4. Other indirect supportive factors to OUM
are:
– hiding subscription limit is the user priority therefore access beyond authorized
quota would automatically be discouraged from user side,
– from CSP perspective, only valid logs of valid attempts are subject to payment
by DataKon, therefore entertaining user request beyond subscription limit can
not be claimed,
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The access request forwarded by user, first goes through the third party where
all the computation process takes place homomorphically. The only information
known at third party is the incremental value of offset which is ψ against ∂ .
Further evaluation on these results by CSP either tells that request is valid or
otherwise.To make everything functional, entire process has been divided into 4
steps which are : Data Outsourcing, Process for User Authorization, User Request
Evaluation and Provisioning of Authorized Data Through Synchronization.
5.1.1 Data outsourcing
Data outsourcing is a periodic activity by DataKon on Eve’s cloud. Reason for
these periodic updates is mainly due to most updated analysis and with furnished
user requirements. With each update previous data is overwritten hence at any
instance of time this data is considered as the latest version. For any authorized
user, this data is represented as Dp. The user request has to route through third
party for which digital signature file of third party Œ is shared with the CSP in
advance. Using digital signatures helps DataKon and CSP in assuring that user
request has followed a legitimate path.Usage of cloud services and volume of data
that travels towards authorized users is logged on Eve’s cloud. As an evidence
on utilization of cloud resources, this log file is used during the payment process
between DataKon and Eve.
5.1.2 User registration and initial setup
A user with desired number of attempts Ua over Dp forwards her request to
Datakon. After the mutual financial agreement in between Datakon and current
user to access the Dp for Ua number of times, Datakon perform following steps to
complete the user registration process.
For unique identification an identifier ∂ is given to user. Value of ∂ is also
shared with third party and CSP. Next is the generation of random number which
we will refer as offset value ψ for user. This value ψ, is shared only with the third
party. The following step is the creation of polynomial P (x) using ψ and (ψ+Ua).
List of coefficients α0...n is forwarded to third party. With each user request, third
party will perform a constant operation Ω on these coefficients. For a particular
user the operational sign ± on these cofficients α0...n are shared with CSP. To
evaluate this polynomial P (x) homomorhpcially Datakon shares σpk and σsk with
third party and CSP respectively. All communication that will take place between
TTP and CSP is encrypted asymmetrically and for this purpose public Kpub and
private keys Kpri are shared with TTP and CSP respectively. With completion of
registration process, user is now ready to request for Dp.
5.1.3 Evaluation of user request at TTP
The request arrives at third party with user id (∂) where this access parameter
remains the same throught the entire lifetime of user access period. Against this
(∂), an offset value ψ, and public key for homomorphic operation σpk has already
been communicated by Datakon in previous step. Third party performs a con-
stant operation Ω by employing the homomorphic encryption over α0...n. Results
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Fig. 2: Flow of user request evaluation at CSP
of this calculation(Υ1...n) is then multiplied with a random number r and finally
∂ is added into this. These values are then sent to the CSP for further evaluation.
The multiplication with random number r helps to hide a unique access pattern at
CSP which is discussed in Section 8.2. This process is repeated whenever a request
arrives at third party. Complete set of values which are encrypted and then sent
to CSP by TTP with each request are given in equation 10
EA({Υ1...n,Œ, ∂},Kpub) (10)
5.1.4 Evaluation of user request at CSP
During the user registration process CSP is shared with Œ, ∂, Kpri and σsk. After
receiving values from third party it is decrypted using the assymetric key Kpri.
DA(EA((Υ1...n,Œ, ∂),Kpub)),Kpri) (11)
Result of equation 11 ends up in { Υ1...n, Œ, ∂}. CSP will use function of homo-
morphic decryption on Υ1...n.
DH(Υ1...n, σsk) (12)
A constant operation of unionmulti starts with the output of equation 12. Its work flow is
shown in Fig 2. If user request comes for the first time, output value of 12 will
be equal to ∂ which would be same as third parameter of equation 11. For first
request, this value i.e. ∂ is compared with already communicated values by data
owner. If this value matches, user is marked active and provided with the syn-
chronization service for data provisioning. Other than first request, value outcome
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Fig. 3: Time required for initial setup and trusted third party for request evaluation
from equation 12 will fall within
∑n
i=2∆yi which is the residual value Rv. If after
availing authorized attempts Ua, user forwards her request to CSP the outcome
of equation 12 will echo back with same value as recorded earlier as Ev. With this
observation CSP will come to know that user has already availed desired number
of attempts Ua and her current and subsequent requests are to be ceased. The pur-
pose of using digital signature Œ of third party is to let CSP know that request has
been forwarded through designated trusted party. The log activity which is stored
at CSP will assist for transparent pecuniary matters with Datakon. Mandatory
values stored in this log for each users are ∂, Œ and ∆y1...n .
6 Implementation
For the viability of OUM and its efficacy the idea has been implemented and
tested on Google cloud [45]. The process of user registration and responsibility of
third party is tested on ocal machine. Further processing on user request via third
party is then transported on Google cloud using the Google app engine SDK [45]
and deploying a Java Web Service. A user request for specific number of attempts
is initialized using local machine and all parameters are shared as discussed in
section 5.1.2. User request is then initiated from local machine to third party
where it is evaluated and its computational results are then send to Google cloud.
The web service running there interacts with incoming parameters and evaluates
the results. The application has been tested and verified for complete range of
values at CSP which are ∆y1...n,n+1 . The graph pattern on these values which is
discussed in section 8.2, found unique and unpredictable during the entire life-
cycle of user access period. All operations that are performed homomorphically
are achieved using the Pascal Paillier cryptosystem. We have used standards Java
SE 7.0 for developing the OUM.
7 Evaluation and Results
OUM is tested on local machine, Google App Engine [45], and Android platform.
Process of user registration and subsequent evaluation on behalf of TTP is ex-
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Fig. 4: Time, cpu and cost estimation on cloud while evaluating user request
Fig. 5: Time comparison for user request evaluation on cloud and Android
Fig. 6: Execution time for different number of attempts
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ecuted on local machine. Initial setup and third party evaluation time is shown
in Fig 3. Role of CSP and relevant execution on user request is done on Google
App engine. While evaluating user request on App engine we have selected the F4
front end instance. This instance has 2400 MHz processing power and 512 MB of
RAM. Fig 4 shows the cpu time, reponse time and cost analysis of user request on
F4 instance. Initial setup by owner and execution steps by third party are tested
on a local machine with Intel(R) Core(TM) i3 processor and 4GB of RAM. Mi-
crosoft(R) Windows7(TM) X 64bit is the OS installed on it. Other than Google
App engine OUM has been evaluated on Android platform too. Comparison of
execution time for request evaluation at App engine and Android is shown in Fig
5. For this purpose Nexus emulator with 512 RAM and VM heap of 32 MB is
selected by using Android SDK [46].
8 Discussion
In this section we will discuss salient features of OUM, pattern evaluation for
Residual values at CSP followed by system limitations.
8.1 Salient Features and Efficiency
The main concept of system design is two fold. First, it authorize users to avail
cloud resources in a more flexible way without imposing any time restriction.
Secondly, the efficacy of hiding user attempts has been achieved using the crypto-
graphic primitives i.e, Homomorphic encryption and private matching. Minimum
complexity of our design have made it light weight at all frontiers which are, setup
activity at owner end and partial execution at TTP and CSP. The worth mention-
ing contribution of our idea is its negligible reliance on number of attempts. The
computational activity for three different users having 10, 500 and 1,000 attempts
respectively consume almost similar amount of time as shown in Fig 6. Execution
time that is consumed at TTP and CSP for different users reveals no clue about
which user has more subscription limit over the others. It is the constant opera-
tion that is performed each time at TTP and CSP no matter it ends up in Kv orRv.
For multiple attempts a particular user can be given with various access keys
where each key is assumed to be used only once. Using this approach might be
efficient where user has few number of attempts. Managing these unique keys for
each attempt will be the responsibility of authorized user which is an additional
burden especially when number of keys are very high. To overcome this, we used
polynomial with multiple roots, for more detailed discussion refer to section 3.2 on
defining polynomial with multiple roots. Instead of creating a polynomial whose
degree and complexity grows with number of user attempts Ua, we devised a more
efficient approach that is free from this limitation. Using only Ua and its offset
value ψ kept degree of polynomial same for all users. For this purpose we used ψ
and (ψ + Ua) while defining the polynomial as given in equation 9.
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Fig. 7: Pattern of Residual values - without randomization
Fig. 8: Pattern of Residual values - with randomization
In initial version of our work this Rv has been found helpful to predict the
number of attempts by CSP. This weakness is then dealt and tweaked effectively
and discussed in next section
8.2 Pattern Evaluation of Residual values
For every request forwarded by a user, CSP performs a constant operation unionmulti.
Outcome of this operation helps CSP to perform various activities like user reg-
istration, data provisioning, and freezing user account. After implementing the
proposed methodology, these values are tested to ensure presence of any pattern
that might be helpful in predicting the user attempts at any stage before it is
consumed in totality. To explain it, a user who is authorized for N number of
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attempts, the value of Rv appeared with following observations.
N/2∑
i=1
Rvi+1 > Rvi (13)
This pattern reflects itself back in reverse value when half of attempts have been
achieved which is
N∑
i=(N/2)+1
Rvi+1 < Rvi (14)
with this pattern, CSP will remain unaware until (N/2) attempts, however; after
that, it can predict the remaining attempts easily. At this stage the role of TTP
will become ineffective as remaining attempts are now obvious to CSP. The pattern
of residual values given in equation 13 and 14 is shown in fig 7. In this fig, two
users with even and odd number of attempts have been tested to find out these
identifiable patterns. In both cases the output value at CSP can be seen as normal
distribution. After half of this distribution is availed, the remaining values are
just in reverse order. To overcome this drawback, OUM design is tweaked by
incorporating randomization by adding a random value in Ω. This randomization
is applied in Ω such that ri ∗ Υ1...n, where r is a random number. The additional
computational cost is again a constant operation and hence never affected the
overall performance. Now all values,
∑N
i=1Rvi that ends up at CSP does not
follow any specific pattern or normal distribution. For verification, two users having
similar number of attempts have been tested. Now, the residual values calculated
by CSP are logged and shown in Fig 8 which gives no clue to predict remaining
number of valid attempts. With this tweak,also the role of TTP remains effective
for the entire lifetime of user validity on cloud data.
8.3 Limitations
The scheme proposed in OUM is best suitable where time anticipation is non
deterministic to access the cloud data. In current approach the data which becomes
inaccessible after permissible number of attempts can still be shared by CSP to
that user if user still holds the effective decryption keys. Our model works under
the assumption that CSP will not collude with malicious user. This breach can
be effective as long as data is not encrypted again by the owner. To meet this
limitation the idea of proxy re-encryption can be incorporated into the existing
system through third party or CSP.
9 Conclusion and Future Work
Cloud services that are related with data usually raise concern for security and
privacy by owner as well as its consumer. Realization on this has been addressed
using our proposed model of OUM. With OUM, we provide task oriented data
access model for users and at the same time it facilitates owner with mechanism
of user revocation. This time independent approach works better in situations
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where time dependent models are hard to implement. Evaluation section on OUM
highlights its design efficiency in terms of time and user privacy. By using OUM
we have achieved to hide legitimate access for authorized users as their business
secret. Design and evaluation mechanism of OUM is independent from number of
user attempts. This feature makes user registration process least time consuming
and similar for all. Triggering CSP to cease user access at a certain point is hard
to guess by introducing concept of echo and residual values.
Current model of OUM focuses on task oriented approach and does not con-
sider time factor in it. Under existing model of OUM, a user once authorized will
remain active until she avails all permissible attempts. For a better control this
indeterministic access period can be bounded with certain time threshold. In our
future work we will combine both approaches of time and task that can meet owner
as well as user requirements in a more controlled and convenient way.
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Appendix A Performance evaluation: Data tables
Performance evaluation presented in Section 6 and 7 is based on the following data
tables. Figure 3 presented the visual representation of Table 2. Similarly, Figure
4, 5, 6, 7, 8 are represented by Table 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 respectively.
Table 2: Time required for initial setup by owner and request evaluation at TTP
with variable key length.
Key Size Setup Time-ms (Owner) Executioin Time-ms(TTP)
256 9.5 8.3
512 20.06 18.33
1024 89.66 103.13
2048 528.7 749.3
Table 3: Cost analysis and execution time at F4 instance of Google cloud.
Key Size CPU time(ms) Response time(ms) Cost($)
256 27 42 .097
512 75 160 .123
1024 551 1120 .175
2048 4438 9013 .278
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Table 4: Execution time on Android and Google App Engine
Key Size Android time(ms) Google app engine time(ms)
256 151 27
512 585 75
1024 2703 551
2048 13487 4438
Table 5: Execution time for different number of attempts(10,500,1000) where key
size is 1024 for all
Attempts Setup time (ms)
by owner
Execution
time(ms) by
TTP
Execution time(ms) by
Google app engine
10 88 99 674
500 87 105 678
1000 89 106 690
Table 6: Values of users request after evaluation at CSP i.e. ∆y1...n (without ran-
domization)
User Attempt user 1 (9 attempts) user 2 (12 attempts)
1 111 55
2 119 66
3 125 75
4 129 82
5 131 87
6 131 90
7 129 91
8 125 90
9 119 87
10 111 82
11 - 75
12 - 66
13 - 55
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